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CHAPTER 5 
Equity and Equity Practice 
HARRY ZARROW 
§5.I. Specific performance: "Quasi in rem" jurisdiction. During 
the 1956 SURVEY year the problem of specific performance was again 
considered in the Supreme Judicial Court. The problem was com-
plicated by the fact that the defendants were nonresidents of Massa-
chusetts. In Churchill v. Bigelow,1 a bill was brought for specific per-
formance of an option to purchase land which was situated in this 
Commonwealth. The plaintiff had entered upon and developed the 
land with permission of the defendants. An attachment of real estate 
of the defendants was made under a special precept, and notice of the 
pendency of the suit was duly given under an order for substituted 
service under a rule of the court.2 The defendants appeared specially 
to object to the jurisdiction. The Supreme Judicial Court considered 
the practical difficulty which would be encountered if ownership was 
divided among persons who resided in various states and a plaintiff 
should be required to bring separate actions in each such state, and 
without hesitation held that it had the power to order a conveyance. 
Execution of the decree offered no problem since a commissioner 
could be appointed to make conveyance. 
Since the land is located in the state, failure to obtain jurisdiction 
"in personam" over the owners is not a bar to specific performance. 
The court will act "quasi in rem." The Court implied that it could 
deal with this problem even without statutory authority.s 
The case of Spurr v. Scoville,4 wherein it was held that a bill for 
specific performance was strictly a proceeding "in personam," was in 
effect overruled. 
Felch v. Hooper'> had seriously weakened Spurr v. Scoville, and held 
that under the facts an implied trust is created and the plaintiff has 
an equitable interest in the land which the court is not powerless to 
liAIlRv ZARROW is a partner in the finn of Lian and Zarrow, Worcester, Massachu-
setts. He is a member of the Massachusetts and Federal bars. 
§5.1. 11955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 975, 129 N.E.2d 9O!J. 
2 Superior Court Rule I4 (1932). 
3 For the Court. Qua. C.J .• said. "If a statute is required to enable a court of 
equity to deal with such an equitable interest quasi in rem. such a statute is found 
in G.L. (Ter. Ed.). c. 20!J. §18." 1955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 975. 977. 129 N.E.2d 9O!J. 905. 
4!J Cush. 578 (Mass. 1850). 
Ii 119 Mass. 52 (1875). 
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enforce merely because the parties holding the legal title are beyond 
its reach. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that any state may by 
statute confer upon its courts jurisdiction over titles to real estate 
within its limits even as against nonresidents if a reasonable provision 
for notice and an opportunity to be heard is given.6 
Since the defendants in Churchill v. Bigelow were informed that the 
purpose of the suit was to obtain title to the land, constitutional re-
quirements were held to have been fully met. Evidently it was felt that 
the defendants could not reasonably have ignored the notice on the 
ground that the action appeared to be one "in personam" and they 
were beyond the Massachusetts court's reach. 
§5.2. Injunctions for protection of personal rights. The juris-
diction of the equity court was invoked in several cases in connection 
with "personal rights." 
In Mark v. Kahn,1 the plaintiff sought to enjoin his divorced wife 
from registering their minor children at school under her present 
surname, she having married Harold Kahn, who had three children 
by a former marriage. The defendant, Mrs. Kahn, had custody of the 
minor children born of her marriage to the plaintiff. A decree was 
entered enjoining the defendant from registering the children at school 
under the surname of Kahn or from representing that their surname is 
Kahn. 
The Supreme Judicial Court recognized the principal that personal 
rights have and should have a standing equal to that of property 
rights. The Court shows a regard, a solicitude, for the "tenuous bond" 
between a father and his children when there has been a divorce. a 
bond which may be weakened, if not destroyed, if their name is 
changed. While it was held that the aid of a court of equity might 
properly be invoked in this case, the decree was reversed and the 
case sent back for a further hearing based upon a consideration of what 
was best for the children instead of on the defendant's motive. 
The principle laid down in Worthington v. Waring,2 to the effect 
that injunctive relief will be granted only in suits based on property 
rights as distinguished from personal rights, was revised in a well-
reasoned opinion by Chief Justice Qua in the justly famous case of 
Kenyon v. Chicopee.3 The basis for injunctive relief to protect 
personal rights was there stated to require these conditions: 
(1) That unless relief is granted a substantial right of the plaintiff 
will be impaired to a material degree; 
(2) That the remedy at law is inadequate; 
(3) That injunctive relief can be applied with practical success and 
without imposing an impossible burden on the court or bringing 
its processes into disrepute. 
S Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U.S. 316, 10 Sup. Ct. 557, 33 L. Ed. 918 (1890). 
§5.2. 11956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 135, 131 N.E.2d 758. 
l! 157 Mass. 421, 32 N.E. 744, 20 L.R.A. 342 (1892). 
a 320 Mass. 528, 70 N.E.2d 241 (1946). 
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Clearly, all of these conditions are present in the Mark case, and 
the Court rightly took the view that it had jurisdiction of the subject 
matter. 
The right of a plaintiff to be protected by injunctive relief from 
having her name publicized further as an alleged member of the 
Communist Party was presented in the case of Luscomb v. Bowker.4 
This question, among other issues, was raised by demurrer. The 
Supreme Judicial Court held that the plaintiff had a right to present 
her case, but very carefully refrained from deciding or commenting 
on the merits of the case. Here, again, the protection of a personal 
right is held to be a proper subject for injunctive relief in equity, 
under certain conditions. This case demonstrates that personal 
liberty guaranteed by the Constitution is as much to be protected by 
equity as is "the right to sell bananas." Ii Inherent in the Luscomb 
case are many other problems, but the principle of protecting personal 
rights and civil liberties by injunctive relief, even when the issue is 
unpopular, was recognized. 
The Court in Krebiozen Research Foundation v. Beacon Press, Inc.,o 
again faced the problem of protection of personal rights. The plain-
tiff sought to enjoin the publication of a book which it alleged was 
false and known by the author to be false in certain respects, and 
which would damage professional reputation and business property. 
Involved in this book was the discussion of the efficacy of a drug, 
"Krebiozen," in the treatment of cancer. The case came before the 
Court on an appeal from an interlocutory decree sustaining the de-
fendant's demurrer and from the final decree dismissing the bill of 
complaint. 
While the Court held that there was no error on the grounds that 
free discussion demanded a withholding of injunctive relief,7 it again 
affirmed its position that equity will protect personal rights by in-
junction, and it went on to establish the broad principle that equity 
jurisdiction does extend to cases of libel and slander. 
§5.3. Equity practice: Undue delay on request for report of evi-
dence. Request for a report of the evidence from the Superior Court 
to the Supreme Judicial Court on an appeal is made under Superior 
Court Rule 76. No time limit is specified in the rule or in the statu-
tory authorization for the rule, G.L., c. 214, §24. In Maraghey v. 
Tarpey! the appealing party was denied such a request without an 
indication of the reason for the denial. The request for the report 
was filed seven weeks after the taking of an appeal. Furthermore, there 
was a four months' delay, from May to September, between the re-
quest and a marking up for hearing. 
41956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1009, 136 N.E.2d 192. 
5 See Kenyon v. Chicopee, 320 Mass. 528, 534, 70 N .E.2d 241, 244 (1916), and cases 
cited. 
61956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 513, 134 N .E.2d I. 
7 For an analysis of this portion of the case, see §11.2 intra. 
§5.3. 11956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 595, 134 N.E.2d 440. 
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The Supreme Judicial Court read a reasonable time limit into both 
the statutory authorization and the Superior Court rule. Justice 
Whittemore held that it was for the trial judge to determine whether 
the appellants had acted with reasonable diligence in filing the request 
for a report and presenting it for action. The request having been 
denied after a hearing. Justice Whittemore held that in the absence of 
any contrary finding. the denial imported a finding of all subsidiary 
facts necessary to justify the denial. 
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